Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Legal Philosophy between State and
Transnationalism Seminar Series

Seminars

9-27-2013

The Reciprocity Theory of Rights

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/
transnationalism_series
Recommended Citation
"The Reciprocity Theory of Rights" (2013). Legal Philosophy between State and Transnationalism Seminar Series. 58.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/transnationalism_series/58

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Seminars at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Legal
Philosophy between State and Transnationalism Seminar Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

The Reciprocity Theory of Rights1
David Rodin
This article provides a theoretical account of a central class of moral
rights; their normative grounding, the conditions for their possession and
forfeiture, and their moral stringency. It argues that interpersonal rights
against harm and rights to assistance are best understood as arising from
reciprocity relations between moral agents. The account has significant
advantages compared with rivals such as the interest theory of rights. By
explaining the differential enforceability of rights against harm and rights
to assistance, the reciprocity theory helps to refute an argument made by
Cecile Fabre that the poor may have a justification for engaging in war
against the affluent to compel them to fulfil their duties of assistance to
the poor.
---We all have rights against certain forms of harm from others, for example
I have the right that you not kill or main me. We also have rights to
assistance in particular circumstances of need, for example if you were
drowning and I could rescue you by throwing a life preserver at no cost to
1
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myself, then you would have the right that I do so. Correlative to these
rights are corresponding duties. 2
Rights have a distinctive stringency, one important feature of which is
that typically they can be permissibly enforced. If I infringe a right then I
may be subject, in the appropriate circumstances, to three forms of
remedial measure: 1) I can be harmed, if necessary, to prevent the
infringement (enforcement through self and other-defence); 2) I can be
harmed to compensate you for the harm resulting from the infringement
(enforcement through restitution); and 3) I can be punished to deter future
infringement (punitive enforcement).
There are significant differences between these mechanisms. The
permission to engage in defence against breaches of the right not to be
harmed is particularly broad in at least two respects. First, rights against
2

Throughout this article I will use the terms ‘right not be harmed’ and ‘right to

assistance’ (and their cognates ‘duty not to harm’ and ‘duty to assist’) in a
common sense way consistent with these paradigm examples. I will not
address the issue of how the two forms of duty can be distinguished in problem
cases, nor how the distinction between duties not to harm duties to assist relates
to adjacent distinctions between positive and negative duties and between
perfect and imperfect duties. Although these are important issues, they will not
materially affect the main lines of argument presented here.
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harm can be permissibly enforced through lethal defensive measures
when necessary (provided that the breach of right which defensive action
averts would inflict a comparable harm). Second, duties not to harm can
be enforced through private defensive measures. By this I mean that
defence against an unjust harm can be permissibly undertaken by private
actors without prior public authorisation. For obvious reasons, one does
not need to obtain prior judicial authorisation for engaging in private selfdefence against an imminent threat.3
These two features of defensive rights – that they can justify intentional
killing, and can be undertaken privately (without the prior consent of a
superior authority) – have been important supports of the widely held
view that defence against grave and systematic unjust threats of harm can
justify war.4 In a striking argument, Cecile Fabre extends this logic from
rights against harm to rights to assistance.5

3

However it is important to note also the limit to private nature of rights of

defence: all developed legal systems will subject acts of private defence to post
hoc judicial scrutiny.
4
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Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012,
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The affluent, she notes have a duty to provide material assistance to the
poor.6 The basis of this duty, Fabre believes, is the human right,
possessed by all, to material resources sufficient to lead a minimally
decent life. Those affluent persons who are in a position to provide such
resources to the poor without threatening their own prospects to lead a
minimally decent life have a duty to do so.7 Those who fail to fulfil this
duty of assistance are engaged in a wrongful omission, which causes the
poor to suffer serious, often life-threatening, unjust harm. Such persons,
Fabre claims, are liable to necessary defensive violence to compel them
to observe their duty to assist. If violations of the duty to assist are
sufficiently grave and systematic, this can form the basis of a just cause

6

As Fabre notes there are different ways in which the affluent could be said to

violate the rights of the poor. In S 3.2.1. she argues that the affluent may be
morally responsible for the deprivation experienced by the poor, either because
they have wrongfully appropriated the property of the poor, or – following an
argument made by Hugo Grotius – because the affluent have refused to return
property to the common stock for use by the destitute. In this paper I will not
address these responsibility-based claims for a duty to the poor. Instead I focus
exclusively on duties to assist the poor that are independent of moral
responsibility for the poverty.
7
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for a war of subsistence by the poor, or their representatives, against the
affluent.8
Fabre’s argument is premised on the assumption that duties to assist have
a comparable stringency to duties not to harm in at least this respect: both
duties can be enforced through private lethal defensive action, when their
breach would threaten a sufficiently grave harm. Underpinning this
presupposition is a particular account of rights - the interest theory as
developed by Joseph Raz. This theory is congenial to Fabre’s argument
because it suggests a fundamental parity between rights against harm and
rights to assistance. According to Raz:
‘X has a right’ if an only if X can have rights, and, other things being
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.9
Rights against harm and rights to assistance are both equally grounded in
the right bearer’s interest (on Fabre’s telling, their interest in leading a
minimally decent life). On this basis it seems natural that the various

8

Ibid. 3.2.3.

9

Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
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forms of right should be equally enforceable when the harm caused by
their breach is equivalent. As we might put it: rights are rights.
However, as I will argue in this essay, there are serious problems with the
interest theory of rights and the equal enforceability thesis it gives
support to. Fabre’s unorthodox endorsement of subsistence war is one
symptom of this deeper problem in the theory of rights. Before we
consider the arguments for this claim, it is Germaine to begin by
reflecting on the fact that equal enforceability of rights thesis is in grave
tension with commonly held intuitions and standard legal provisions.
In almost all legal jurisdictions, for example, duties to assist are enforced
in very different ways to duties not to harm. Every jurisdiction
criminalises attacks on the person and attacks on property. However,
only a handful of jurisdictions criminalise the failure to provide
assistance to others to whom one does not owe a pre-existing duty of
care. Moreover, legal duties to assist are only enforced in cases where
the obligation to give assistance is extremely undemanding on the duty
bearer, and the harm that may be averted is particularly grave.
It is true that citizens in many jurisdictions can be legally compelled to
assist others through mandatory participation in collective welfare
measures, for example redistributive taxation and social insurance
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schemes. But duties to assist strangers are not enforceable in law through
lethal measures and they are not privately enforceable. I am aware of no
jurisdiction that provides a justification for private killing, or the threat of
killing, in order to compel compliance with a duty to assist, even when
such action may be necessary to avert death. Notoriously, a number of
jurisdictions even criminalise the unauthorised taking of property
required for subsistence.
It is true that the private infringement of property rights can sometimes be
justified when necessary to avert a great harm. But this justification is
both different to, and weaker than, the justification generated in private
defensive action. Consider the classic case of a hiker lost in a storm who
breaks into a privately owned cabin in order to save his life. The case has
the following features: 1) the hiker is all things considered permitted to
break the door of the cabin, and 2) the owner of the cabin would be under
a duty to assist the hiker by offering him food and shelter were he present
and in a position to do so. Notwithstanding these two features the hiker
has the duty to compensate the owner for his loss after the fact. This is
not true of standard cases of self-defence in which the party harmed by
the defensive action has no right to compensation. This suggests that
even when a person is under a legal and moral duty to assist, they may
retain a degree of normative entitlement to the resources required to fulfil
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that duty that is quite different to the liability to harm in standard cases of
defence.10
Now of course, morality is not always congruent with the law, and it may
be that these legal provisions are simply unjustified in moral terms (or
justifiably deviate from underlying morality). However it is striking that
the law accords better with our moral intuitions than Fabre’s reading of
the interest theory in these cases. Consider, a modified version of Peter
Singer’s famous example of a man who comes upon a boy drowning in a
fountain.11 If I were observing the incident from a neighbouring building
10

The most natural way to explain this difference is to say that the cabin owner

(unlike the aggressor in self-defence) retains his right against interference
in his property - a right that is justifiably infringed by the hiker. However,
as an anonymous reviewer points out, an alternative explanation is that
the owner has a complex right of this form: to either not have his door
broken, or in cases in which breaking the door is necessary to satisfy a
dire need, to be compensated for the breaking of the door. In either case,
the cabin owner retains a degree of normative control over the resources
needed for assistance of others that is quite different to standard defence
cases.
11

Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Philosophy and Public

Affairs, 1.1 1972, 229-243.
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and I possessed a high powered rifle and a loud-hailer, then it seems that I
would not be permitted to shoot the man dead if he refused to rescue the
child and doing so was necessary to save the child’s life (suppose that the
man’s body would fall into the fountain enabling the child to clamber
out). Moreover, it seems doubtful that I would even be permitted to
threaten the passing man with death if he did not rescue the child.12 This
is the case even if we accept that the passing man is under a duty to
rescue the child.

12

Jon Quong has objected that these examples involve opportunistic harming (in the

sense employed by Warren Quinn) whereas certain violent acts visited on the affluent
by the poor to compel them to fulfill their duties would merely involve eliminative
harming. Many theorists believe that opportunistic harming is more difficult to justify
than eliminative harming. However, as Quong concedes, the example can be
reformulated to involve only eliminative harming. An example would be if we
suppose that the man at the fountain were holding the life preserver, and shooting him
would cause him to release his grip allowing it to fall into the fountain. Moreover,
many acts undertaken by the poor in the course of a subsistence war, as envisaged by
Fabre, would clearly be acts of opportunistic harming: for example threatening the
affluent with violence if they did not fulfill their duties to assist. (On the
opportunistic/eliminative distinction see Warren Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and
Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (1989): 334–
51, 344; Jonathan Quong, “ Killing in Self-‐Defense”, Ethics, 2009, Vole 119, 507-537,

525ff.)
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These moral intuitions and legal precedents strongly suggest that there
are significant differences between the enforceability of rights to
assistance and rights against harm, and that rights to assistance are, in
general, neither enforceable through lethal means, nor are they generally
privately enforceable. If rights to assistance are not enforceable in these
ways, then Fabre’s argument in favour of subsistence wars must fail.
This is because war necessarily involves lethal and private enforcement
of rights (war is private enforcement in the sense that it is a form of selfhelp - there is no superior public authority to give prior consent).
However, we do not want deep issues in the theory of rights to be settled
by appeal to intuition alone. We should aspire to a theoretical explanation
for why duties not to harm ground significantly stronger rights of
enforcement compared with duties to assist. Given the significant
intuitive differences between rights against harm and rights to assistance,
what (if anything) can explain and justify them? I will argue that this
explanation can be provided by what I will call the reciprocity theory of
rights.
The Reciprocity theory of rights
An important class of interpersonal rights are best understood as deriving
from reciprocity relations between moral agents. The difference between
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rights to assistance and rights against harm stem from the different ways
the two forms of right (and their correlative duties) arise out of moral
reciprocity relations. Rights against harm are (in part) grounded in
reciprocal compliance with metal obligations. Rights to assistance are (in
part) grounded in reciprocal expectations of future compliance with metal
obligations. This difference explains the greater stringency of rights
against harm compared with rights to assistance, even when the breach of
both rights would lead to equivalent harms.
The reciprocity theory begins from a basic observation about the genesis
of rights: agents can come to possess rights when they comply with the
obligations generated by the rights and status of others. Rights, in other
words, may arise out of moral reciprocity. The mechanism by which
rights are generated through reciprocity is one of the most basic and
deeply rooted in moral psychology – the requirement to give respect and
consideration to those who give respect and consideration to us. Rights
are in this way mutually reinforcing, and this is one of the most important
and efficacious features of a system of rights. In the following sections I
will demonstrate how reciprocity can provide a powerful account of
rights against harm and of rights to assistance.
Before doing so, let me first clarify what kind of theory the reciprocity
account aspires to be. First it is not a formal analysis of the concept of
Rights, Reciprocity and Resource Wars
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rights; that is to say it is not an account of what rights are. Neither is it a
theory designed to settle the question of what rights there are, in the sense
of specifying a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the
possession of a right by an agent. This is because, as I will indicate
bellow, not all rights (and not even all moral rights) are grounded in
reciprocity relations. A complete theory of rights will therefore need to
be pluralist, with the reciprocity theory forming one explanatory element
among others.
Rather the reciprocity account is a normative and justificatory theory.
My claim is that for a class of centrally important rights reciprocity
provides the best explanation for why we possess these rights and why
they possess the normative features they do.13 I will be especially
concerned with explaining their stringency, and their liability to forfeiture
in certain situations.
I begin with rights against harm. Consider a paradigmatic right against
harm, such as the right not to be killed (or its logical equivalent, the duty
13

As I will indicate bellow there are unanswered questions as to precisely

what is the extent of the class of rights explained by reciprocity, but it
certainly includes some of our most important human rights including
basic security rights and rights to assistance in dire need.
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not kill ). This right is best explained by mutually supporting reciprocity
relationships between moral agents: I have the right that you not kill me
because and to the extent that I comply with your right that I not kill you.
Similarly, you have the right that I not kill you because and to the extent
that you comply with my right that you not kill me.
As is suggested by the 'because' and 'to the extent' clauses in this
specification, the reciprocity theory has two components. First
reciprocity functions as the justificatory ground of the right – it explains
why we have the right and, crucially, as I will explain bellow, why it has
the stringency it does. Second reciprocity provides an account of the
conditions for possession and loss of the right. Both components are
necessary features of a satisfactory normative theory of rights. However,
the latter has in general been poorly served by existing accounts of rights.
A significant benefit of the reciprocity theory is that it provides a better
account than rivals of the conditions for possession and loss of rights and
duties. Let us begin here.
One of the most important features of rights is that they are dynamic in
nature. By this I mean that rights are capable of altering their
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configuration over time in determinate ways.14 As we have already
noted, persons who have a right against being harmed can sometimes
become liable to suffer harm in the course of defensive, restorative and
punitive action designed to remedy a breach or threatened breach of
rights for which they are responsible. In each of these cases, an agent’s
right against harm becomes transformed into a limited liability to suffer
harm. When this happens we typically say that the right in question has
been forfeit.15 On standard accounts, an agent forfeits rights (and thereby

14

Note that my usage here differs from that of Joseph Raz, who uses the term

‘dynamic’ to refer to his supposition that rights can serve as the ground of
future duties in ways that may be unforeseen. See The Morality of Freedom,
supra, 171.
15

There is an alternative tradition according to which rights can never be

forfeit. Instead rights are assumed to possess a complex specification as to their
scope, which entails that they do not apply in situations in which it is necessary
to harm a rights holder to remedy a wrongful act for which he is responsible.
However, as I have argued elsewhere, nothing material hinges on whether we
adopt the forfeiture or specification terminology (self-identifying footnote
removed). Any claim about the forfeiture of rights can be rephrased without
loss as a claim about specification and vice versa. All the arguments that I here
employ utilising the terminology of forfeiture can be rephrased mutatis
mutandis using specification terminology.
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becomes liable to harm) by infringing or threatening to infringe certain
significant rights of others.
A critical test for any theory of rights is that it coherently account for
both the conditions for the possession of rights and the conditions for
their forfeiture. This is a task that the interest theory of rights in
particular has great difficulty in performing. The reason is that the
interest theory fails to account for the fact that conditions for the
possession of a right and conditions for its forfeiture are necessarily
correlative. I will call this requirement 'the forfeiture principle' and it can
be formally specified as follows:
If x is a necessary condition for the possession of y, then the absence of x
is a sufficient condition for the forfeiture of y.
Similarly
If x is a sufficient condition for the forfeiture of y, then the absence of x
is a necessary condition for the possession of y.16
The forfeiture principle articulates a perfectly general requirement on the
relationship between the possession conditions and the forfeiture
16

Forfeiture here is not assumed to presuppose fault on the part of the forfeiting party.

Roughly speaking forfeiture is the non-consensual loss of a right due to a failure to
comply with some standard or requirement.
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conditions of any right or object. Utilising it we can easily show that
possessing an interest in x is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for possessing a right to x.
Take each claim in turn. If we accept (along with standard accounts) that
responsibly infringing certain rights of others is a sufficient condition for
forfeiting a right against necessary and proportionate harm inflicted in the
course of defensive, restorative, or punitive action, then it must be the
case that not infringing the rights of others is a necessary condition for
possessing the right against being harmed in that way. It follows that a
person's interest in avoiding those harms is not a sufficient condition for
possessing the right against that harm. In central cases, therefore,
possessing an interest in x is not sufficient for possessing a right to x.
Interest theorists, of course, have long acknowledged that possessing an
interest in x is not sufficient for having a right to x (for example my
interest in the $1000 in your bank account is not sufficient to generate a
right to it). But the interest theory is committed to the narrower claim
that where a genuine right to x exists, the right holder’s interest in x is a
sufficient explanation for his possession of the right. Indeed, as we have
already seen, for Raz it is part of the definition of rights that “an aspect of
X’s wellbeing (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other
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person(s) to be under a duty.”17 But the present argument shows this
claim to be false. In the case of forfeitable rights (the vast majority of all
rights) it is never the case that possessing an interest in x is a sufficient
condition for possessing the right to x. This is because the absence of
forfeiture conditions function as a necessary condition for possession of
any right.
Turning now to the second claim, it is clearly the case that one can lose
one's interest in x without forfeiting one's right to x. Suppose I have some
baby equipment which I no longer need now that my children have
grown. The equipment is used and has no financial, sentimental, or
option value for me. Indeed, because I have find storage it has a disvalue.
If possessing an interest in owning the equipment were a necessary
condition for possessing a right to it, then it would follow that I forfeit my
right to the equipment when I cease to have an interest in it. Patently I do
not.
Of course sophisticated versions of the interest theory such as those of
Joseph Raz and Mathew Kramer do not hold that the possession of a right
must in all circumstances be in the interest of the right holder, merely that
it must in general be true that possessing such a right serves the interests

17
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of its bearers.18 But this move to what is generally in the interests of
persons will not diffuse the current objection. For it is clearly not the
case that it is generally in the interests of persons to have property rights
over redundant or superfluous objects. In central cases, possessing an
interest in x (by either an individual person or by persons generally) is not
a necessary condition for possessing a right to x.
The reciprocity theory, in contrast, conforms to and gains support from
the forfeiture principle. We have just seen that if the standard account of
the conditions for the forfeiture of a right is correct, then it is a necessary
condition for the possession of a right that one not infringe certain rights
of others - exactly as the reciprocity account specifies that it is. This is
not surprising. The reciprocity theory is a forfeiture-lead account. It
derives from taking seriously the dynamic nature of rights; the fact that
rights can transform into their Hohfeldian opposites through a process of
forfeiture under certain conditions.
How damaging is this challenge to the interest theory? One might argue
that the force of the challenge is limited. All that I have shown is that
18

Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University Press,

1986, 180; Matthew H. Kramer, “Rights Without the Trimmings” in A Debate
Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries Matthew H. Kramer, Simmonds N.E.,
and Steiner Hillel, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 200, 94.
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possessing an interest in x is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for possessing a right to x. But this does not show that interests are not
the central grounds for the possession of a right. Nothing prevents the
interest theorist from accepting that compliance with the rights of others
is an independent condition for the possession of a right. Fabre makes this
move explicitly in a separate discussion of defensive rights.19
Similarly, just because some feature is a necessary condition for the
possession of a right, it does not follow that it is the most salient moral
ground of the right. Consider an analogy: one forfeits one's medal at the
Olympics for failing the mandatory drugs test. It follows that passing the
drugs test is a necessary condition for possessing the right to the medal.
But it does not follow that the right to possess the medal is most saliently
explained by the successful passing of the drugs test. One might suppose
that my claim that the right not to be killed is grounded in the reciprocal
compliance with the right to life of others makes a similar mistake to the
claim that an athlete's right to the medal is grounded in his passing of the
drugs test. It confuses a necessary condition for the possession of a right
with a sufficient explanation of that right.
But, unfortunately for the interest theorist, these comforting thoughts are
19

Cecile Fabre, “Permissible Rescue Killing”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society, Vol. cix, Part 2, 149-164, 153.
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unwarranted. We need to explain how the proposed independent
conditions can be coherently integrated into a unified account of the
possession and forfeiture of rights. Without such an account the
conditions are objectionably ad hoc. In the case of the Olympics we can
provide precisely such an integrated account by invoking the conception
of fair competition. The two conditions of winning the race and passing
the drugs test appear normatively disconnected, but they are in fact
integrated at a deeper level: they are both complementary aspects of
prevailing in a fair competition.
To account for the possibility of forfeiture, the interest theorist is
compelled to posit two conditions for the possession of a right – the
(neither necessary nor sufficient) interest condition, and the (necessary)
condition of complying with the rights of others. But he cannot provide
an account of how the two conditions can be integrated in a coherent
explanatory conception, given his underlying theoretical commitments.
When an aggressor wrongfully threatens the life of a victim, he has no
less an interest in continuing to live than at any other time. Why should
the threat he poses to the rights of others undermine his right to life, when
it in no way undermines or negates his interest in his own life and
welfare? It would be as if the athlete was stripped of his medal for failing
a drugs test, when the drug in question gave him no unfair advantage.
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Such a forfeiture condition would be objectionably arbitrary because it is
entirely disconnected from our underlying account of the appropriate
grounds for possessing a medal. In a similar way, the interest theorist can
claim that complying with the rights of others is a necessary condition for
the possession of a right, but he can't explain it in the context of a theory
that sees rights as based in interests that are sufficient to ground duties.
The forfeiture conditions are arbitrary in the context of the broader
theory.
Why can't the interest theorist simply say that a right to x exists whenever
an agent’s interest is sufficient to hold some other person under a duty,
but the agent’s interest in x can only be sufficient in this way when he
complies with the relevant rights of others.20 The answer is that if one
accepts that complying with the relevant rights of others is a precondition
for an agent to possess a right (holding others to be under a duty), one has
thereby abandoned the supposition that the agent’s interest – however
specified – is sufficient for holding those other persons to be under a
duty. After all, the agent’s interest in the object of his right is identical
before and after the forfeiture. The explanatory work is being done by
the condition of compliance, not the interest. To reiterate the point made
above, if a right can be forfeit through non-compliance with obligations,
20

I am indebted to Jon Quong for raising this point.
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then it cannot be the case that any interest could ever be sufficient for the
possession of that right.
If this line of objection is sound, then the interest theorist faces a stark
choice between four inhospitable options. First, he could seek to provide
an account of how the proposed normatively disconnected conditions for
the possession of a right are in fact coherently integrated at a deeper level
(as the drugs test condition for possessing the medal is integrated through
a theory of fair competition). But it is far from clear what this deeper
account could be, given the resources of the interest theory.
Alternatively, he could restrict the interest theory to an analysis of the
concept of a right and abandon any normative aspirations (that is to say
he could restrict the interest theory to an account of what rights are, and
deny that it has any implications for what rights there are or for the
substantive normative features of rights).21 However, it is clear that
mainstream interest theorists such as Joseph Raz have viewed the theory
as having both an analytical and a normative function.22 Indeed, it would
be bizarre if it were not the case. Moreover, restricting the interest theory
to a purely analytical domain would forestall its use in substantive
21

I am grateful to Leif Wenar for pushing me to consider this point.

22

Raz makes this clear at The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Oxford University

Press, 1986, 171-2.
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normative argumentation in the way that Fabre, for example, uses it.
Third, the interest theorist may abandon the supposition that rights are
forfeitable. This course is not impossible, but it is highly costly. It will
require the interest theorist to give an account of how harming persons in
the course of defensive, restorative, or punitive acts is justified, even
though the persons subject to the harm retain a right against being so
harmed. This could potentially be achieved by developing an account of
how such practices justifiably infringe rights, but such an account will
clearly play havoc with central tenets of moral and political theory.
Failing these three options, the only alternative is to abandon the central
claim of the interest theory - that rights are most basically grounded in
interests.
What of the reciprocity theory? Unsurprisingly, it has little difficulty in
accounting for the possession and forfeiture conditions of rights. On the
reciprocity theory, the conditions for the forfeiture of rights are the
inverse of the possession conditions - exactly as the forfeiture principle
specifies they must be. If we possess rights because, and to the extent
that, we comply with the rights of others, then we can forfeit our rights by
infringing the rights of others through our own responsible action.
Interests are not irrelevant to the possession and forfeiture of rights on
this account, of course. First, interests play an important role in
Rights, Reciprocity and Resource Wars
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determining the proportionality of permissible harm producing measures
in forfeiture contexts. The wrongfulness of a rights-infringing act is in
part determined by the extent to which it harms the interests of the injured
party, and this in turn informs the permissible limits of remedial action.
Can the reciprocity theory provide a deeper explanation for why the
forfeiture condition of rights (failing to comply with the rights of others)
also provides - through its negation - the possession condition of rights?
Yes it can. The explanation is provided by the principle that persons are
deserving of respect and consideration because, and to the extent, that
they give respect and consideration to others.23
This principle has two significant advantages. First, it is attractive in its
own right. It links the possession of rights with the fulfilment of
responsibilities in an intuitively appealing way: no rights without
responsibilities. Second, the principle coheres with the logical structure
of rights. Claims, liberties, duties, powers, immunities and the other
23

This raises an important question about why we ought not to torture torturers, rape

rapists or (arguably) execute murderers. I believe that the answer is that rights and
other obligations owed to persons are not the only moral considerations relevant to
how we ought to treat them. There can be compelling reasons not to treat a person in
a cruel or inhuman way, even if the person himself lacks rights against such
treatment. I develop this idea extensively in “Explaining the Absolute Prohibition on
Torture” (unpublished manuscript available on request).
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Hohfeldian incidents that constitute the domain are rights are all
distinguished by a common feature. They all exist in correlative pairs of
Hohfeldian incidents.24 This suggests that, at the deepest level, the
grounding of rights must lie in features of the relationship between the
subject and object of rights; paradigmatically between right holder and
duty bearer. Rights cannot arise independently of the normative status
and agency of duty bearers and vice versa. The reciprocity theory is
designed to give voice to this feature of rights. In this respect it contrasts
strikingly with the interest theory, whose account of the grounding of
rights is not inter-relational, but unilateral. The interests that this theory
supposes to lie at the ground of rights speak solely to the status and
normative needs of the rights bearer.
Rights to assistance
Reciprocity can provide a powerful explanatory account of central rights
against harm. But what of rights to assistance? It might be thought that
reciprocity can have little to say about rights to assistance, since those
rights do not typically arise in relationships of symmetrical reciprocity.
When I fulfil your right to assistance, it is rarely the case you are
simultaneously assisting me. To be sure there are exceptions. We might
24
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think of two stranded climbers each obligated to assist the other by
sharing their body warmth. But such cases are atypical. Indeed, duties to
assist normally arise in asymmetries of power and need.
However reciprocity relations can give a persuasive account of a
significant class of rights to assistance – an explanation that goes a long
way to explaining the central intuitions about stringency and
enforceability with which we began. Consider a familiar scene from the
life of a frontier community. Farmer John’s barn has burned down, and
the whole town has come together to rebuild it for him. The townsfolk
recognise that they are under a duty to assist the unfortunate Farmer John.
Suppose you ask one of those toiling on the new barn, why they are
obligated to assist John. They might respond: “well, he would do the
same for me if it had been my barn”.
What underlies this familiar form of moral reasoning is the following
normative principle: when a person acknowledges a duty to assist you in
a given circumstance, this can create a duty for you to assist them in
comparable circumstances. In other words, duties of assistance can also
arise from reciprocity relations. The nature of the reciprocity relation
underlying rights to assistance is, however, different to that which
underlies rights against harm. As we have seen, rights against harm arise
from reciprocity in actual compliance – I have the right that you not kill
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me because I am at this moment complying with your right that I not kill
you. Rights to assistance, on the other hand, arise from an expectation of
future reciprocal compliance. As we will see bellow, this difference in
the forms of reciprocity underlying the two rights can do much work in
explaining the intuitive differences between them.
We can test the hypothesis that rights to assistance are grounded in
reciprocity relations by applying the forfeiture principle to it. If it is
indeed a necessary condition for an agent to possess certain rights to
assistance that they acknowledge a duty to assist others in similar
circumstances, then those rights of assistance must be forfeitable in cases
where the agent fails to recognize the reciprocal duty. In fact, when we
examine cases, this is precisely what we find.
We do not normally think of rights to assistance as being forfeitable, but
it is clear that they can be. Consider the following. I live an area subject
to very cold winters but I can’t afford a four-wheel drive car. As a
consequence I frequently become stranded in snowdrifts. Each time I do,
my neighbour, who drives a brand new Range Rover, zooms past
shouting out the window: “get a real car, you bum!” Finally I save up
enough money for a set of snow tires. The very first time I drive out with
my new tires I pass my neighbour who – having unwisely taken his
Ferrari instead of the Land Rover – is now stuck in a snowdrift.
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Although it would be generous of me to stop, it seems clear that my
neighbour has no right to my assistance in these circumstances. I would
not wrong him if I simply continued on my way. His right to assistance
from me is conditional on his recognizing a reciprocal duty to assist me in
comparable circumstances. By repudiating this duty he has forfeit his
own right to assistance from me. This is consistent with the reciprocity
theory of duties to assistance.
It might be objected that this is plausible in the case of relatively trivial
interests, like the interest in being towed out of a snowdrift. But it might
be denied that rights that protect profound interests like our interest in a
minimally decent life - or our interest in life itself - can be forfeit. The
following case shows this supposition to be false. Suppose my neighbour
is a notorious anti-Semite. He constantly tells me that he wishes that I,
and my kind, would disappear from the face of the earth. While he will
abide by the criminal law and does not threaten to physically attack me,
he makes it clear that he would not lift a finger to help me. One day I
pass my neighbour fishing by the canal, and he immediately launches into
an hysterical tirade. Brandishing a document, he says that he has just
come from his solicitor where he has established a legally binding
mandate prohibiting any of his property, agents, or dependents from
assisting me in any way, even if such assistance were necessary to
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preserve my life. At that very moment he falls into the canal, and, being
unable to swim, begins to drown. I am standing near the life preserver
and could easily save his life by throwing the preserver, at no cost to
myself. Does the neighbour have the right that I save his life?
It is important to be clear about different potential sources of a duty to
throw the life preserver. Perhaps the neighbour has children or other
dependents who would suffer were he to die. It is plausible that they may
have a right to my assistance that grounds a duty to rescue the neighbour.
Similarly there may be virtue-oriented reasons for acting. To save the
neighbour would be gracious and generous, whereas allowing him to
drown would be petty, vindictive, and mean-spirited. In purely
consequentialist terms, there is also a compelling case for rescue. The
goods that can be realized by throwing the preserver (not only the saving
of a life, but also potentially bringing about a transformation in his
bigoted attitudes) hugely outweigh the costs. All of these reasons may
ground a strong duty to rescue the neighbour. But what is hard to believe
is that the neighbour himself has a right that I rescue him – that if I failed
to throw the preserver I would be wronging him by treating him in a way
that he a right not to be treated. By renouncing any reciprocal duty to
assist me in comparable situations, the neighbour has forfeit his own right
to assistance.
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Forfeiture cases such as these powerfully rebut the Razian conception
that rights are always grounded in interests sufficient to hold others to a
duty. In the present case the neighbour has a profound interest in
continuing to live, I have the capacity to secure his interest, and the costs
that I would have to bear in doing so are negligible. But these interestrelated considerations are not sufficient for holding me to a duty. The
neighbour has no right to assistance that I would breach by failing to act.
In contrast, the reciprocity theory can explain why rights can be forfeit in
cases like the above. Certain rights to assistance are centrally grounded in
the recognition of a reciprocal duty to assist others in comparable
circumstances. Where such recognition is absent, so to is the right.
As in the case of rights against harm, we must enquire whether the
conditions for the possession and forfeiture of rights within the
reciprocity theory are coherently integrated in the explanatory account.
Once again the answer is yes. Both the conditions for possession of rights
to assistance and the conditions for their forfeiture are explained by the
underlying moral principle of reciprocity that states that we are deserving
of consideration and respect because, and to the extent, that we give
consideration and respect to others. As in the case of rights against harm,
the reciprocity theory of rights to assistance thereby explains in an
integrated manner both the grounds of the right – why we have it – and
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the conditions for the possession and loss of the right.
It might be objected that the ‘duties’ arising out of reciprocally
recognized undertakings to assist are merely a form of prudential selfinterest (you will be better off in the long run if you assist others in their
hour of need) or a means of facilitating aggregate welfare for a
community (everyone will be better off in the long run if they assist
others). Relationships of mutual preparedness to assist certainly are often
supported by prudential and consequentialist reasons of this kind. But
this is not the whole story. A person who credibly undertakes to assist
me were I to be in need, places me under a reciprocal obligation to
provide comparable assistance in similar circumstances. This is the case,
independent of the balance of prudential and consequentialist reasons.
The differential stringency of rights against harm and rights to assistance
I have so far argued that certain central interpersonal rights are best
understood as grounded in moral reciprocity relations between agents.
The reciprocity theory has an advantage over rivals, such as the interest
theory, in that it can better explain the dynamic nature of rights: the way
that rights can be generated or forfeit by complying or failing to comply
with the obligations we owe to others.
I will now explore a second important advantage of the reciprocity
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theory: its ability to explain the differing stringency between rights
against harm and rights to assistance, and also the differing stringency of
rights to equivalent forms of assistance held by different classes of
agents. This will return us to Fabre’s argument about resource wars.
I noted above that rights against harm appear to be more stringent than
rights to assistance in two critical respects. Duties not to inflict
significant harms such as death or severe attacks on bodily integrity can
be enforced through lethal means. Second, duties not to harm can be
enforced through acts of private self-defence (without the prior consent of
a superior public authority). As we saw, common intuitions and legal
precedent suggest that neither claim is true of rights to assistance. But
why should this be?
A familiar argument for why duties not to harm are more stringent than
duties to assist is that the cost of compliance for the former is lower than
for the latter. All that the duty not to harm requires of us is to abstain
from harmful or threatening acts, whereas the duty to assist requires
positive and often costly agency. However this thought is both wrong
and misleading. It is wrong because fulfilling duties not to harm can in
fact impose far greater compliance costs than could justifiably be
imposed by a duty to assist. Consider familiar cases in which you can
avoid death only by killing an unrelated innocent bystander (for example
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if the only way to save oneself from a wrongful aggressor was by using
an innocent bystander as a human shield). In such a situation observing
one’s duty not to harm the bystander requires the sacrifice of one’s life.
The duty not to kill is so stringent that, even when the right-bearer is a
stranger, it can generate a duty to suffer death as the cost of compliance.
Contrast this with the sacrifice that can be reasonably required to fulfil a
duty to assist a stranger. It is difficult to imagine any circumstance in
which a duty to assist a stranger could require the sacrifice of one’s own
life. (As will be discussed bellow, duties to assist family members, loved
ones, or those who have rendered life saving services to us in the past
can, in contrast, impose great obligations of sacrifice.)
This example shows how misleading is the traditional argument that the
stringency of duties not to harm is grounded in their lower compliance
costs. In fact, precisely the opposite is the case. The capacity to impose
higher compliance costs on duty bearers is one important feature of the
greater stringency of duties not to harm. The challenge is to explain why
it is reasonable to impose higher costs as the price of complying with
duties not to harm, compared with duties to assist.
This is a difficult question to answer on many theories of rights.
Obviously the interest theory is not conducive to explaining these
phenomena. If a duty not to harm and a duty to assist are both equally
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grounded in the rights-bearer’s interest in continuing to live, then it is
mysterious why the one duty can impose greater compliance costs on the
duty holder than the other. But other prominent accounts also struggle.
For example, the ‘distributive justice’ theory of self-defence pioneered by
Phillip Montague and implicitly endorsed by a number of theorists
including Jeff McMahan, claims that when wrongful harm will inevitably
fall on someone, justice demands that it fall on the person responsible for
the wrongful harm.25 But in the innocent bystander case neither you (the
victim of attack) nor the bystander is responsible for the prospective
wrongful harm. Why should justice require that you sacrifice your life as
the cost of not killing the bystander? Why not simply toss a coin to
determine who should receive the harm, or say that it is morally arbitrary
where the harm falls?
In contrast, the reciprocity theory has a very simple explanation for why
you are required to not kill the bystander even at the cost of sacrificing
your own life. You owe the bystander the consideration of not killing
25
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him, because he is extending the same consideration to you. Your
obligation to him stems from the fact that he is at this very moment
complying with the requirements of your right to life – and that is
something of immense value and importance for you. You therefore owe
him the reciprocal duty.
The highly stringent nature of rights against harm is, therefore, linked to
the distinctive character of the reciprocity relations that underlie them.
As we have seen rights against harm are grounded in a reciprocity of
actual compliance. This reciprocity of compliance has a
contemporaneous and an historical element. You can possess rights
because you have satisfied the conditions of compliance for the rights of
others in the past or, as in the paradigm case of the right to life, because
you are satisfying the conditions of compliance for the rights of others at
this very moment. Thus I currently possess the right that you not kill me,
because I am at this moment complying with your right that I not kill you.
The right against lethal harm is rooted in contemporaneous actual
compliance and this is what gives it its distinctive stringency.
At this point we must face an important objection. It is a well-known
weakness of the will theory of rights that it has great difficulty in
ascribing rights to incompetents since the theory holds that rights can
only be held by agents capable of exercising powers. It might seem that
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the reciprocity theory suffers from a similar weakness since it insists that
agents possess certain rights because and to the extent they comply with
the rights of others. But complying with the rights of others might seem
to require the performance of acts and omissions with the intention of
conforming to the requirements of the right. In that case we could not
ascribe rights to infants, the mentally disabled, the comatose and the
unconscious who are not capable of such agency. A related problem
might seem to befall the attribution of rights against harm to persons who
do not know of our existence or have no capacity to inflict harm on us.
Can such persons really said to be complying with our right not to be
harmed in a way that could ground reciprocal obligations to them?
But the reciprocity theory does not suffer from the same weakness as the
will theory with respect to rights against harm. This is because it is
perfectly possible to comply with a negative duty, without intentional
agency or the capacity for non-compliant action. To see this consider the
following case: You and I have adjoining gardens and there is no
regulation governing when we may mow our lawns. However I am
having a garden party on Saturday and I ask you to undertake not to mow
your lawn during the party. I agree to pay you $50 provided you have
complied with your undertaking. What are the conditions for your having
complied in such a way as to generate and obligation on me to
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compensate you? The answer is simply that you not mow during the
specified time. What if you take a nap for most of Saturday afternoon so
that you are performing no intentional act or omission during this time?
Clearly while you are napping you are still in compliance with your
obligation not to mow. What if you have a fall on Friday evening and
spend the whole of Saturday unconscious in hospital so that you have no
material capacity to violate your obligation? Again you are still clearly in
compliance with your obligation in such a way as to merit the resulting
compensation. Compliance with an obligation to abstain from (harmful)
behaviour does not require the capacity for intentional agency, or even
the capacity for any agency at all. Compliance with a negative obligation
when you are in a state of incompetence is not onerous (indeed noncompliance may be physically impossible), but this does not mean that
the compliance is not genuine, nor that such compliance is incapable of
grounding reciprocal obligations on others.
That being said, it is clearly not the case that any non-performance of
harmful action is sufficient to generate a reciprocal right against harm.
The loaf in my kitchen is not currently slicing me in two (nor has it ever
done so) but it does not thereby acquire a right against being sliced in
two. If an individual is to comply with a negative duty in such a way as
to acquire a reciprocal right, then it must be a being of the kind that is
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capable of possessing rights and duties, and it must actually possess such
a duty. Human beings are beings of this kind. Humans are capable of
having duties not to harm others and they do actually possess such duties.
Moreover they continue to be subject to such duties – and to be in
compliance with them – while they are sleeping, comatose or otherwise
in a state of incompetence.
We have seen that rights against harm possess the stringency they do
because they are rooted in a reciprocity relationship of actual compliance
to mutual obligations. As we noted above, the reciprocity relations
underlying rights to assistance have a different character, and this
explains their lesser stringency. Rather than being rooted in a reciprocity
of actual compliance, they instead typically stem from a reciprocity of
expected future compliance. Most of the people we are called on to assist
are not currently assisting us and nor they have assisted us in the past.
Instead, the obligation to assist others arises from the fact that they
acknowledge a reciprocal obligation to assist us in comparable
circumstances in the future. The reciprocity relationship underlying
rights to assistance is prospective and moreover it is conditional (he
acknowledges an obligation to assist me were I to be in need). This
prospective and conditional reciprocity grounds a genuine duty, but it
lacks the stringency that derives from the reciprocity of actual
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compliance that we find underlying rights against harm because it is
merely a reciprocity of expected compliance.
The difference between these two forms of reciprocity is both epistemic
and ontological. It is a matter of objective fact whether you are currently
complying or failing to comply with my rights against harm or have done
so in the past. Moreover, I can know with near certainty that you are
currently complying with my right to life, because it is quite obvious that
you are currently making no attack on my person.26 But it may be
impossible, even in principle, to determine now whether you will assist
me at some point in the future, since this depends on your future free
decisions. Certainly I can know your preparedness to assist me in the
future with a much weaker degree of certainty than I can know your
current or prior compliance with your duty not to harm me.
Sometimes of course, duties to assist may arise not from expected future
assistance, but from actual past assistance. In such cases we find that the
right to assistance is indeed more stringent (and may be comparably
stringed to rights against harm) precisely as the reciprocity theory
predicts. For example suppose you saved my life in the past. It would be
natural to say that ‘I owe you my life’ and that I would be obligated to
26
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bear significantly higher costs in the course of rescuing you, than if you
had not assisted me in the past in this way. Indeed, although we are not
ordinarily obligated to sacrifice our own life to save others, it is plausible
that I may be obligated to sacrifice my own life if this were necessary to
rescue you (countless movies have turned on this supposition).
The reciprocity theory can explain not only the differing stringency
between rights against harm and rights to assistance. It can also explain
why identical interests and needs can generate significantly different
duties to assist in differing classes of agents. For example we have
stronger duties to assist those with whom we share special relationships
than we do to assist strangers, even when the needs are the same. That
makes sense from the perspective of reciprocity. On this theory, the
strength of the duty to assist depends on the expectation of future
reciprocal assistance in comparable circumstances. But that in turn
depends on the strength and depth of social relationships. I know with
great intimacy what forms of support and assistance my close friends will
provide to me in moments of need. This knowledge guides and supports
the interlocking obligations of care and consideration that are partially
constitutive of friendship. The same is true with my family. That is why
duties of care for friends and family are so strong. With strangers I have
far less reason to believe that they recognize, and are ready to act upon, a
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stringent obligation of assistance towards me in comparable
circumstances.27
Nonetheless we can have duties to assist strangers. Most obviously we
can have strong duties to assist strangers who are compatriots, through
participating in public welfare institutions. The reciprocity theory can
explain these duties and moreover why these duties can be stronger than
duties owed to non-compatriot strangers. Legal regimes play a decisive
role in enabling duties of assistance between strangers. Once a duty to
assist is legally enforced (for example through a compulsory social
insurance scheme), that very fact provides a strong reason, that would
otherwise not exist, to expect that others within the regime will contribute
towards assisting me should I be in need. This explains why duties to
assist can be justifiably enforced through public institutions. The
27
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mechanism of enforcement is itself partially generative of the very duty it
enforces. That is to say, by making it the case that I that my compatriots
can be relied on to contribute to assisting me in moments of need, legal
enforcement generates a moral obligation for me to contribute towards
provision for their need. This fact, in turn, explains why, other things
being equal, we have a greater duty to assist compatriots than foreigners.
The reasons need have nothing to do with metaphysical notions of blood
and identity. It is rather because of the very concrete way in which law
enforces prospective reciprocity among members of a community, and
thereby generates duties of assistance between them.
For strangers who are not compatriots within a shared legal framework,
the basis of expected future reciprocity rests on something more tenuous a shared presumptive understanding of common humanity. We rightly
assume that most people are prepared to assist others in cases where the
need is high and the cost of assisting is low. To be sure, we cannot be
certain that all persons will recognise such an obligation, and clearly
some do not. But knowing what we do of humanity (in both ourselves
and in others) it is a reasonable presumption, at least until defeated by
further evidence. This is why I had to tell such a peculiar story in the antiSemite case to make plausible the forfeiture of a right to costless
assistance. This defeasible presumption is sufficient to ground a duty to
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assist. The shape of this duty conforms to the intuitive shape of our duty
to assist strangers with whom we share no publically enforceable
institutional arrangement – we have the duty to assist in cases where the
need is great and the costs of assistance are low.
So the reciprocity theory can explain a raft of commonly held intuitions
about the stringency of rights and duties. Duties not to harm are
extraordinarily stringent because they derive from reciprocity in actual
compliance of mutual obligations. Duties to assist are weaker because
they are grounded in an expectation of expected future compliance with
mutual obligations. They are weaker still when shared social relations
are tenuous and there is no shared legally binding enforcement
mechanism.
This same family of considerations explains why duties not to harm are
privately and lethally enforceable whereas duties to assist are typically
not. The global poor can have rights to assistance from the affluent. But
those rights have a different character to the rights against harm that can
generate rights of lethal private defence. When someone makes an
unjustified attack on your life they attempt to kill you at the very moment
that you are complying with their right not to be killed. The stringency of
the duty explains the exceptional permission to enforce the duty through
private lethal defence.
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When someone who is under a duty to provide assistance to a stranger
fails to do so, the harmful effects may be identical to unjustified
aggression, but the source and stringency of the duty is different in at
least this respect: There is no concurrent relationship of reciprocal
compliance underlying the duty to assist – the poor do not at this moment
provide life giving assistance to the affluent.
In fact, there seems to be a close congruence between the harms we can
be obligated to bear as a consequence of complying with a duty, and the
harms that we can permissibly inflict on another to prevent his breaching
a duty (they may, indeed, be correlative). As we have seen in the
innocent bystander case, I can be obligated to sacrifice my own life as a
consequence of fulfilling the duty not to kill a stranger. This is congruent
with the permission to kill a person who responsibly breaches the duty
not to kill another. But no one is obligated to sacrifice their own life as a
consequence of fulfilling a duty to assist a stranger when they are not
themselves responsible for the stranger’s plight and where the stranger
has not rendered life preserving services to them in the past. Similarly it
is impermissible to enforce compliance with a duty to assist by killing the
person who threatens to breach that duty. Subsistence killing, let alone
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subsistence wars, are impermissible.28
Conclusion
How comprehensive an account of rights can the reciprocity theory
provide? This remains an open question. Above, I described the class
rights I wished to explain as ‘interpersonal rights’. It is time to say more
about what I take this to mean. Interpersonal rights may be contrasted
with institutional rights. Institutional rights can only be held within a
social and political order and are necessarily mediated by social
institutions; in particular institutions of government. We could not make
sense of the possession or assertion of institutional rights within the state
of nature. Paradigm examples of institutional rights include procedural
rights (for example due process rights) and political rights (for example
rights of democratic participation).

28

Numerous case-generated intuitions powerfully support this conclusion: Tax

evasion is not permissibly enforced with the death penalty, even if shortfalls
resulting from unpaid tax would foreseeably result in the deaths of several
persons. The Oxfam representative who rightly tells me that I have a moral
duty to donate money to save the lives of impoverished persons in the third
world does not act permissibly if he threatens to shoot me in the head when I
tell him that I will instead spend the money on book of moral philosophy.
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Interpersonal rights are Hohfeldian relations between persons that can
exist independently of a social and political order (we can conceive of
them existing in the state of nature). In this sense they are normatively
prior to institutional rights. The paradigms of interpersonal rights – and
those most conducive to the reciprocity theory – are rights of bodily
integrity and self-ownership: the rights not to be killed, attacked, or
tortured. Although I have not been able to argue the case here, liberty
rights, privacy rights, and rights to freedom of expression and conscience
also fit the reciprocity paradigm. These are some of our most important
human rights, but interpersonal rights can also include less fundamental
moral rights, for example the right to be treated with courtesy and
consideration, and the rights and duties of friendship. As we have seen,
interpersonal rights grounded in reciprocity can include rights to
assistance as well as rights against harm.
Not all rights fit easily within one of these categories. Property rights, for
instance, contain certain characteristics of interpersonal and institutional
rights (because the contours of property ownership are fundamentally
embedded in social and legal arrangements). While the reciprocity theory
is most conducive to interpersonal rights, our discussion of how
mandatory social insurance schemes can be grounded in positive
reciprocity relations shows that some institutional rights can also be
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amenable to a reciprocity analysis. It may be that the scope of the
reciprocity theory can be further expanded into the institutional domain
by investigating the role of complex and mediated reciprocity relations
within social institutions. On the other hand certain rights will almost
certainly resist explanation within the reciprocity paradigm because they
are non-forfeitable (due process rights are a clear example).
Similarly, certain rights to assistance will be challenging for the
reciprocity theory because the agent to whom the duty is owed may not
be in a position ever to reciprocate assistance. Intergenerational rights
also present distinctive difficulties, although transitive and asynchronous
reciprocity relations may enable us to get traction on certain
intergenerational rights (consider how parents who neglect their children
in youth may forfeit the right to be cared for by them in old age). All of
these issues require considerable further work and development. To the
extent that genuine classes of right resist explanation within the
reciprocity theory, we will be required to adopt a pluralistic account of
rights in which reciprocity relations are one ground of rights among
others.
It should be noted that I have here developed the reciprocity account of
rights as an alternative to other standard accounts, most notably the
interest theory. But this account is not incompatible with those others,
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and it may therefore be viewed as a supplement rather than an alternative
to them. Suppose it were true that the duty not to kill and the duty to
provide minimal resources to the poor have a common source in the
interest all humans have in leading a minimally decent life. There would
still be this significant difference between them: the right not to be killed
is additionally underpinned by a moral relationship of concurrent
reciprocal compliance, whereas the right to assistance is not. This
difference can explain the many intuitive differences between duties not
to harm and the duty to assist, including why the right not to be harmed is
lethally and privately enforceable whereas the right to be assisted is, in
general, not.
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